When your security checklist misses the biggest threat: the enthusiastic PM
Description
Six-panel CommitStrip comic titled “Security checklist.” Panel 1 shows a developer in tactical gear guarding a cylindrical database behind barbed-wire with the caption “Anti-SQL-injection protection” and a large green checkmark. Panel 2 shows another dev happily typing on a laptop wrapped in heavy chains, captioned “SSL and OpenSSL up to date,” also with a green check. Panel 3 depicts a huge mechanized salt grinder labeled “Passwords hashed with salt,” with a developer turning the crank; green check. Panel 4 lists “Multi-factor authentication on the back-office,” showing a developer entering through a secured door; green check. Panel 5 reads “AES encryption on sensitive data,” illustrating a developer monitoring several screens, again a green check. Panel 6, captioned “Preventing the PM from sending the whole unencrypted database by email,” shows a project manager about to hit send on a tablet, overlaid by a big red X. The strip humorously highlights that despite strong technical controls - SQL-injection defenses, TLS patching, salted hashes, MFA, and AES - the human factor (a well-meaning PM) can still undermine security, underscoring classic DevSecOps lessons about social engineering and usability versus security
Comments
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We deployed zero-trust, FIPS-validated, SOC2-compliant everything - then spent the afternoon begging the PM to stop treating Outlook as S3
After implementing quantum-resistant cryptography, zero-trust architecture, and SOC2 compliance, the biggest security vulnerability remains the PM with database read access and an Outlook account. Next sprint: implementing a middleware that intercepts emails containing SELECT * and replaces them with cat memes
You've got military-grade encryption, salted hashes, MFA on the back-office, and a database fortress that would make Fort Knox jealous - but your PM still has 'Send' permissions and Outlook auto-complete. Congratulations, you've built a bank vault with a screen door. The real zero-day exploit isn't in your code; it's in your org chart. At least when the breach happens, you can tell the board you had a comprehensive security checklist - just nobody thought to add 'prevent management from being the attack vector.'
Nailed OWASP Top 10 mitigations, but forgot email's the dev's favorite zero-day exfil vector
Anti-SQLi, TLS, salted hashes, MFA, AES - impeccable defense-in-depth; then the PM emailed the prod dump as a CSV because “SSL means it’s encrypted,” proving the real perimeter is Outlook
We nailed SQLi, TLS, salted hashes, MFA, and AES‑256, then got pwned by the only zero‑day that never gets patched: Export → Email → PM - aka the Layer 8 bypass for every DLP rule