UEFI Secure Boot: the Vendor Lock-In loophole via “security reasons” excuse

Threat model: anyone who dares boot an OS we didn’t preload. Countermeasure: fuse our key into UEFI, call it “Secure Boot,” and voilà - security and vendor lock-in share the same line item

After 20 years in the industry, I've learned that 'security reasons' is just enterprise-speak for 'we need to justify why your $5000 workstation won't boot that Ubuntu USB without a three-day ticket to IT and a signed affidavit from Microsoft.'

Ah yes, Secure Boot - the feature that's definitely about protecting you from rootkits and absolutely not about ensuring only Microsoft-blessed bootloaders can initialize your hardware. It's pure coincidence that implementing it requires either paying for code signing certificates, using vendor-controlled keys, or spending hours in MOK Manager hell. The fact that it makes dual-booting Linux feel like defusing a bomb while reading UEFI specs is just a happy accident in the name of security. Nothing says 'open computing platform' quite like needing permission from a certificate authority to boot your own hardware

UEFI Secure Boot: the only PKI where rotating keys requires opening a ticket with your OEM and hoping the next dbx update doesn’t brick GRUB at 2 a.m

UEFI “Secure Boot”: where the root of trust is a vendor PKI and the threat model is the customer

Secure Boot: outsourcing your root of trust to the vendor who can't patch Log4Shell in a weekend